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Marks are traditionally said to serve three functions that are separate
from the goals of other forms of intellectual property: source identification,
advertising, and guarantee of quality. The story, however, that patents and
copyrights incentivize creation and that trademarks do not fulfill that pur-
pose does not withstand scrutiny. This Article argues that brands have
evolved in such a way that they serve important incentivizing purposes of
their own and that trademark law influences their ability to do so. This
Article identifies three generally neglected functions of trademarks. The
first pertains to the creation of original, unique marks and brands in and of
themselves. Indeed, this Article contends that marks and brands possess a
fan base that engages in artistic and other appreciation similar to the enjoy-
ment derived from copyrighted works. The second underexplored function
of trademarks and brands is to combine with products and provide new
hedonic experiences to consumers in a way that is qualitatively little differ-
ent from experiences of copyrighted or patented goods. Third, and perhaps
most controversially, trademarks and brands—in part, but not exclusively,
through the creation of status goods—may incentivize socially desirable
behavior such as hard work and productivity that may increase overall eco-
nomic welfare. This Article thus seeks to restore, or rather construct for the
first time, as a theoretical matter the stature of trademarks as a full member
of the family of intellectual property. The conclusion results that any future
changes to trademark law and policy must account for effects on the incen-
tivizing functions of marks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
MOST professors begin intellectual property survey courses byteaching students about the dividing line between patents andcopyright on the one side and trademarks on the other. Patents
and copyrights incentivize invention and creation, as well as the distribu-
tion of goods, the story goes. These legal instruments are rooted in the
Intellectual Property Clause, which allows Congress “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”1 The Supreme Court made clear early on, in the so-called
Trade-Mark Cases, that trademarks had no business being protected
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
2016] Branded 715
under the same clause.2 The Court specified that trademarks can only be
regulated under the Commerce Clause and, hence, only when they relate
to interstate or foreign commerce, and that “[i]f not so limited, it is in
excess of the power of Congress.”3
While the Court got it right in the Trade-Mark Cases as a strictly con-
stitutional matter, we must be wary of the intuitive appeal of the stories
that have developed as a result of the case and its progeny—which pit the
inventor/creator hero against the workmanlike “villain” (or at least red-
headed stepchild) that is the trademark owner. After all, what relation-
ship is there between a merchant that slapped a mark on his products to
better attract customers and an inventor or creator that slaved away for
years, as well as managed to infuse her work with a “flash of genius”?
Marks are traditionally said to serve three functions that are separate
from the goals of other forms of intellectual property; these three are
source identification, advertising, and guarantee of quality.4
Like so many appealing stories, however, the story that patents and
copyrights incentivize creation and trademarks do not serve that function,
does not withstand scrutiny. This Article argues that brands have evolved
in such a way that they serve important incentivizing purposes of their
own and that trademark law has tracked that evolution without explicit
ties to the theory and language of incentives. This Article identifies three
heretofore-neglected functions of trademarks that bear little overlap with
the three traditionally recognized goals that sought to protect consumers
against fraud and deceit just as other forms of tort law did. These func-
tions all relate to the fact that trademarks now form a vital part of brands,
which are created after significant research into consumers’ values, hab-
its, and preferences.
The first largely overlooked function pertains to the creation of origi-
nal, unique marks in and of itself. Indeed, this Article argues that logos
and other marks possess a fan base that engages in artistic and other ap-
preciation similar to the enjoyment given copyrighted works. The second
underexplored function of trademarks is to combine with a product to
provide a new hedonic experience to consumers in a way that is qualita-
tively only little different from the experience of a copyrighted or pat-
ented good. Trademarked goods have just as much potential to add to
human happiness or ability to experience meaning as the types of prod-
ucts covered by other forms of intellectual property. Third, and perhaps
most controversially, trademarks—in part but not exclusively through the
creation of status goods—may incentivize socially desirable behavior such
as hard work and productivity that keep the engines of the world running.
In the classic Christmas movie Miracle on 34th Street, the young janitor
Alfred tells us: “[y]eah, there’s a lot of bad ‘isms’ floatin’ around this
2. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
3. Id. at 96.
4. I previously discussed these functions in Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks,
51 ARIZ. L. REV. 381, 387 (2009).
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world, but one of the worst is commercialism.”5 We must remain open to
the possibility, however, that the commercialism of trademark owners
helps to drive the economy by incentivizing consumers to be more crea-
tive and productive than they would need to be for bare subsistence.
This Article seeks to smooth the dividing line between copyrights/pat-
ents and trademarks. The argument shows how the reconceptualization of
trademarks as an incentivizing instrument gains importance when legisla-
tures and courts consider modifications to existing laws and policies in
this area. While the eventual answer to the question of where to make
changes will need to consider a number of factors, including moral priors
and economic evidence, one of these factors should be the consequences
on the incentivizing functions of brands, as bolstered by trademarks. Only
by acknowledging the ways in which these functions would be strength-
ened or weakened can a full evaluation of the tradeoffs involved occur.
Part II describes the legal landscape of our current intellectual prop-
erty regime, distinguishing between patents, copyrights, and trademarks,
and showing both the parallels and differences between the three
branches. Part III discusses the trademark legal regime in greater detail,
with a focus on doctrines that have developed outside of the traditional
framework of infringement resulting from consumer confusion at the
point of sale. Part IV presents the three incentivizing functions of trade-
marks and their relationship to the law and legal change. Part V
concludes.
II. THE THREE FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
DISTINGUISHED
Trademarks, copyrights, and patents are typically grouped together
under the rubric of intellectual property and are each ruled by their own
statutory regimes.6 All three types of goods are intellectual in that they
are created by the mind and remain intangible, but they can each possess
great value.7 How and why we call them property, and whether that is a
legitimate designation, has been debated at great length.8 This Part will
provide the relevant background on each regime and show the main simi-
larities and distinctions between the current legal treatment of each form
of intellectual property.
5. MIRACLE ON 34TH STREET (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation 1947).
6. See generally, BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 168 (1999).
7. For a discussion of the origins of the phrase “intellectual property” and its applica-
bility over time, see Justin Hughes, A Short History of “Intellectual Property” in Relation to
Copyright, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1293 (2012).
8. See generally, Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Prop-
erty Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing the propertization of intellectual prop-
erty); Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993); Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual Property
Infringement as Vandalism, 18 STAN. L. TECH. REV. 331 (2015) (analyzing the relationship
between intellectual property and property law, including as it applies to the sanctions
regime of intellectual property).
2016] Branded 717
A. PATENTS
U.S. patent law grants rights to the inventor of a process, machine, arti-
cle of manufacture, or composition of matter that is new, useful, and non-
obvious.9 A patent holder may exclude others from making, using, sell-
ing, offering for sale, importing, inducing others to infringe, and/or offer-
ing a product specially adapted for practice of the patent.10
To obtain a patent, the invention must be novel in the sense that it was
not generally known to the public before the applicant invented it, and
nonobvious in that it embodies more than a trivial change from prior
art.11 The standards to establish this are high and the patent examination
process exacting.12 In contrast, a trademark may be protected without
any showing of novelty, non-obviousness, or originality.13 Patent law is
designed to encourage inventors to disclose their new technology to the
world by offering the incentive of a limited-time monopoly on the
technology.
Patents are granted and issued through the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO).14 In addition to utility patents, which are granted for a
process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, appli-
cants can receive a design patent for ornamental designs of a functional
item.15 The term of a utility patent is twenty years from the earliest patent
application filing date, although this term can be extended via patent
term adjustment.16 The current term for a design patent is fifteen years.17
Once the patent term expires, the subject matter that the patent covered
then enters the public domain and is free for anyone to use.18
B. COPYRIGHTS
The current U.S. copyright laws most immediately resulted from the
Copyright Act of 1976, as amended by several later-enacted copyright
provisions.19 The Act spells out the basic rights of copyright holders, codi-
9. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2012).
10. § 271.
11. §§ 102, 103.
12. §§ 102, 103.
13. See Justin Hughes, Cognitive and Aesthetic Functionality in Trademark Law, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1238 (2015). Because of the different standards for protection, the
functionality bar to trademark protection is essential to ensure that trademark registration






19. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2002). Section 106 grants five exclusive rights to copyright
holders, all of which are subject to the remaining sections in chapter 1, currently, § § 107-
122: (1) the right to reproduce (copy) the work into copies and phonorecords, (2) the right
to create derivative works of the original work, (3) the right to distribute copies and pho-
norecords of the work to the public by sale, lease, or rental, (4) the right to perform the
work publicly (if the work is a literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pantomime, mo-
tion picture, or other audiovisual work), and (5) the right to display the work publicly (if
the work is a literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pantomime, pictorial, graphic,
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fies the doctrine of “fair use,” and, for most new copyrights, adopts a
unitary term based on the date of the author’s death, rather than the
prior scheme of fixed initial and renewal terms.20
These copyright laws protect “original works of authorship” when fixed
in tangible form.21 The purpose of copyright law is to stimulate the crea-
tion and dissemination of works of authorship to benefit the public. This
includes an array of expressive works, including literary, artistic, and mu-
sical works, as well as sound recordings and audiovisual works.22 Many
expressive works are also capable of serving as trademarks.23 Indeed, if
the design is novel and nonobvious, it may further be eligible for design
patent protection.24
C. TRADEMARKS
While trademark protection has its roots in common law, Congress
most significantly utilized its powers to pass the Lanham Act governing
trademarks in 1946, with a clearly articulated purpose “to protect the
public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the busi-
ness community the advantages of reputation and goodwill by preventing
their diversion from those who have created them to those who have
not.”25 The Act provides for federal registration of trademarks and ser-
vice marks that are distinctive and used in commerce and offers an array
of remedies against parties who infringe on such marks.26
Trademark law serves two primary purposes: first, to protect consumers
from being confused or deceived about the source of goods or services,
and second, to encourage merchants to stand behind their goods and ser-
vices by protecting the goodwill they have developed in their trade-
marks.27 Trademarks arise only through the actual use of a mark to
indicate the source of the goods or service, and the public must actually
recognize the mark as a source indicator for it to be protected.28 If a term
begins to be used generically by the public, the mark loses its
protection.29
sculptural, motion picture, or other audiovisual work). The Act was amended in 1995 to
include a sixth exclusive right: the right to perform a sound recording by means of digital
audio.
20. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2012).
21. § 102.
22. § 102(a).
23. See, e.g., Application of World’s Finest Chocolate, Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1015
(C.C.P.A. 1973). It is not unusual for trade dress to be protected both by a design patent
and by a trademark under unfair competition law.
24. Id.
25. S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (1946).
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2005).
27. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV.
813, 818 (1927). “The true functions of the trademark are . . . to identify a product as
satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public.” See
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. Inc., 514 U.S. 159,163-64 (1995).
28. §§ 1051(a)(1), 1127.
29. See DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1936).
Regardless of how much money DuPont had invested to persuade the public that “cello-
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Under the Lanham Act, federal registration of trademarks is available
only if an applicant shows that the mark has been used in commerce or
that he has a bona fide intent to use it in commerce.30 Under the common
law and § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the exclusive rights of a trademark
owner are generally limited to the geographic area in which the owner
was the first to use the mark and has used it continually.31 Thus, different
parties may be able to use similar trademarks for similar goods or ser-
vices sold in distinct geographical areas. Although federal registration al-
lows trademark owners an even greater expansion of their common law
rights by giving nationwide rights of priority to registered trademarks, the
federal registration statute does not displace any preexisting common law
rights.32
Three of the most fundamental sections of the Lanham Act are: § 2
that sets forth the standards for registering a trademark; § 32 that pro-
tects federally registered trademarks against unauthorized uses that are
likely to confuse or mislead the consumer as to the source of the goods or
services; and § 43(a) which provides a cause of action against false state-
ments made by others in connection with the offering of goods or ser-
vices, including infringement of an unregistered trademark.33
A mark must be distinctive to get protection under the Lanham Act as
a trademark, meaning that it must be capable of distinguishing the goods
or services in connection with which it is used from goods or services
offered by another source.34 Distinctiveness in the trademark context has
been defined as the “tendency to identify the goods sold as emanating
from a particular, although possibly anonymous, source.”35
There are two ways in which a trademark can be distinctive: it can be
inherently distinctive or it can acquire distinctiveness through use.36 A
mark is inherently distinctive if, starting from the moment that its use
commences, “[its] intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular
source.”37 Further, trademarks are traditionally divided into four catego-
ries of distinctiveness: arbitrary/fanciful, suggestive, descriptive, and ge-
neric.38 If a mark is categorized as either arbitrary/fanciful or suggestive,




32. MARY LA FRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 13 (2011). Because the
federal registrant’s nationwide priority is based on constructive rather than actual use, any
party that had established common law priority rights through actual use of an identical or
confusingly similar mark and who has not abandoned the mark, retains priority over the
federal registrant in the geographical area where the actual use took place.
33. §§ 1052, 1114, 1125(a).
34. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 46.
35. Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distributors, Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 585 (2d
Cir. 1993).
36. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 47.
37. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000) (citation omit-
ted).
38. See Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir.
1983), abrogated by 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
720 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
it “bear[s] no relationship to the products or services to which they are
applied.”39 These arbitrary/fanciful and suggestive marks are considered
to be inherently distinctive, and exclusive rights to them are determined
solely by priority of use.40 One well-known example of an arbitrary term
used as a trademark is “Apple” for computers.
Marks that are classified as descriptive or generic to the particular
goods or services to which they are applied can acquire distinctiveness
through use if there is proof of secondary meaning.41 A descriptive term
identifies a characteristic or quality of an article or service, and secondary
meaning arises once “the primary significance of the term in the minds of
the consuming public is not the product but the producer [of it].”42
Nonetheless, generic terms like “computer” cannot receive trademark
protection even if secondary meaning is established.
In 1995, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA)
and added § 43(c) to the Lanham Act, which created a cause of action for
dilution of the selling power of famous marks.43 The purpose of the Act
was “to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the
distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence
of a likelihood of confusion.”44 The protection is available to both regis-
tered and unregistered trademarks.45
D. TRADEMARKS, PATENTS, & COPYRIGHTS:
COMPARED AND CONTRASTED
Congress derives its authority to enact legislation to protect trade-
marks, copyrights, and patents from two sources. In the case of copyrights
and patents, the Constitution provides that authority pursuant to the IP
Clause through which, for limited times, authors and inventors are
granted the exclusive right to the writings or inventions they have cre-
ated.46 In contrast, Congress’s power to enact trademark laws originates
in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.47 Since the trademark stat-
ute is founded on the Commerce Clause, federal trademark legislation
39. See id. at 791.
40. See id.
41. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211. The phrase “secondary meaning” originally arose
in the context of word marks, where it served to distinguish the source-identifying meaning
from the commonplace, or “primary,” meaning of the word. Secondary meaning has since
come to refer to the acquired, source-identifying meaning of a non-word mark as well. See
id.
42. Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 791; Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118
(1938).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2005); see also Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985-86.
44. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
45. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730
(2006). In 2006, Congress enacted the Trademark Dilution Revision Act (TDRA) to clarify
various aspects of Section 43(c).
46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Power “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”).
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must bear a relationship to interstate commerce to be valid.48 Because
the Commerce Clause does not contain a “limited times” provision, Con-
gress has the power to protect trademarks indefinitely.49
The rights of a trademark owner continue for as long as the owner
keeps using the mark, rather than abandoning it.50 In contrast, patent and
copyright laws provide protection for fixed statutory periods.51 The exclu-
sive rights of a federal patent or copyright owner are nationwide in scope,
whereas the geographical scope of a trademark depends on whether the
mark derives its protection from common law, state statute, or federal
registration.52 The owners of trademarks, patents, and copyrights can
seek civil remedies to protect their goods, although the law only imposes
criminal punishments on copyright and trademark violators, and not pat-
ent infringers.53
A number of goods receive protection under more than one IP regime,
sometimes simultaneously and at other times sequentially. Questions of
how to calibrate IP protection in those contexts have been of particular
sensitivity due to the possible risk of IP owners using a regime like trade-
marks to extend their now-defunct rights under, say, patent law in a way
that thwarts congressional intent in providing the proper term and scope
of patent protection. This issue famously came up in the case of TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., in which the Supreme Court
decided that functional designs could not receive trademark protection
and that a design whose patent protection had expired would be pre-
sumed to be functional.54 Courts’ treatment of the relationship between
the different branches of intellectual property has thus largely been a cau-
tious one, in which courts sought to maintain the separation of the re-
gimes, rather than comment on their parallels.
Scholars have at times, however, directly or indirectly acknowledged
some of these parallels. For instance, Clarisa Long has emphasized the
informational function of patents, which she stated can be more valuable
to the IP owner than the actual substance of the right.55 Similarly, a rich
copyright portfolio can serve as a marker of quality to customers of a
company.56
48. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2005).
49. §§ 1058, 1059.
50. Id.
51. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(2), 173 (2012); 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2002). As mentioned,
rights under utility patents and design patents commence on the date that the patent is
granted and end twenty years from the date the application was filed; the term of a design
patent ends fifteen years from the date on which the patent issues. The present term of
copyright protection for works created after December 31, 1977 is the life of the author
plus seventy years, or, in the case of works made for hire, the shorter of ninety-five years
from publication or 120 years from creation. 17 U.S.C. §§ 302-304 (2002).
52. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 13.
53. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 2320 (2008); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2012). For an explanation of this
phenomenon, see Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Prop-
erty Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 469 (2011).
54. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001).
55. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 628 (2002).
56. I would like to thank Dmitry Karshtedt for our conversation on this subject.
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III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADEMARK LAW
The common law has always recognized that a primary goal of trade-
mark law is to prevent mistake, deception, and confusion with regard to
the origin of goods.57 In addition to protecting consumers from being
confused or deceived about the source of goods or services, trademarks
help to protect the goodwill that merchants have developed for their
products.58 Trademark law reduces the customer’s search costs since a
customer is assured that the product with a given mark is made by the
same manufacturer and is of similar quality as an item she liked in the
past.59 The law also ensures that the producer “will reap the financial,
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”60 The
dual function of trademark law protects both buyers and sellers in that
context.
Throughout the twentieth century, the courts and Congress broadened
trademark law.61 “Early cases sought to protect producers from illegiti-
mate diversions of customers they had worked to attract. Modern trade-
mark law, by contrast, seeks to protect brands, construed broadly.”62 This
Part sketches the development of trademark law from its early days,
which focused on a more limited set of functions of trademarks, to its
current shape. In doing so, it shows how the goals of trademark law may
have initially diverged from those of other areas of intellectual property,
but increasingly converged over time.
A. TRADEMARKS AT COMMON LAW
Trademark law is rooted in common law and is part of the broader law
of unfair competition.63 The common law was particularly concerned with
the tort of “passing off,” where merchants attempted to divert sales to
themselves by falsely representing the source of their goods as their com-
petitors and capitalizing on their goodwill.64 Merchants deceived custom-
ers by either using competitors’ trademarks to falsely market their own
products or employed other means to suggest false origins of the products
(such as by imitating packaging or the appearance of the originals).65 The
distinction between trademark infringement and unfair competition was
that trademark infringement involved the imitation of the source identifi-
ers—i.e., the marks—whereas in unfair competition the imitated features
were descriptive of the products only because the public had come to
57. See Time, Inc. v. Motor Publ’n Inc., 131 F. Supp. 846, 848-49 (D. Md. 1955).
58. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co. Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995).
59. See id.
60. Id. at 164.
61. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1896 (2007).
62. Id.
63. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 1.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id.
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associate these features with a single source of the goods.66 Whatever the
basis of the infringement, the underlying concern was that the consumer
was being deceived as to the source of the goods.67
Today, trademark infringement encompasses both imitation of the
trademark and of features that have acquired secondary meaning.68 Al-
though fraudulent intent was an element of such common law causes of
action, the element of intent has gradually decreased in importance as
protecting consumers from confusion has become paramount even if the
confusion was inadvertent.69 Although trademark law is a subset of the
law of unfair competition, it is by far the most significant.70 Under the
common law, a trademark is protected regardless of whether it has been
registered, provided that it is not a functional feature of a product, and
assuming that it distinguishes in the consumer’s mind one seller’s goods
from another’s.71 Many states have enacted statutes that apply to unregis-
tered trademarks and have created registration systems that provide en-
hanced protection to registered marks.72
B. EARLY FEDERAL STATUTORY ENACTMENTS
& THE TRADE-MARK CASES
The first trademark law enacted by Congress in 1870 provided for fed-
eral registration in the Patent Office for all trademarks used within the
United States regardless of whether they were used in interstate com-
merce.73 Six years later, Congress passed further legislation making the
fraudulent use, sale, and counterfeiting of registered trademarks punisha-
ble by fine and imprisonment.74 In 1879, in the Trade-Mark Cases, the
Supreme Court struck down these statutes on the grounds that they were
unconstitutional.75
The three cases before the Supreme Court involved criminal prosecu-
tion for violations of this trademark legislation. The Court articulated the
well-understood propositions that the right to adopt and use a trademark
had long been recognized at common law as well as by the statutes of
some states, and that any right that Congress had to legislate in this area
must be from the Constitution of the Unites States, which is the source of
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2005).
69. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, § 5:2 (4th ed. 2009).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION SECTIONS 2-4 (1995). The Re-
statement (Third) of Unfair Competition sets out the modern law of trademark and unfair
competition and reflects the focus on consumers’ purchasing decisions rather than the sub-
jective intent of the seller. See id. The Restatement also recognizes as unfair competition
false statements about the source of one’s own goods, as well as false representations about
the source of another’s goods, known as reverse passing off. See id.
71. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 5.
72. Id.
73. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. L. 198-217.
74. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, 19 Stat. 141.
75. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 99 (1879).
724 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
all powers that Congress can lawfully exercise.76
Under the Constitution, Congress was authorized “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times, to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”77 The Supreme Court held that Congress had exceeded
its authority under this clause because the statutes extended trademark
protection without regard to the originality or creativity of the mark.78
Highlighting the important distinctions that separate copyright and pat-
ent rights from the subject matter of trademark law, the Court noted that
“the ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or
discovery.”79
The trademark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something
already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party using it. At
common law the exclusive right to it grows out of use, and not its mere
adoption. By the act of Congress, this exclusive right attaches upon regis-
tration. But in neither case does it depend upon novelty, invention, dis-
covery, or any work of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no
genius, no laborious thought. It is simply founded on priority of
appropriation.80
While the Supreme Court noted that such legislation “may be within
the competency of legislatures whose general powers embrace that class
of subjects, [the Court was] unable to see any such power in the constitu-
tional provision concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and
discoveries.”81 The Court next examined the Commerce Clause to deter-
mine whether it conferred the requisite authority on Congress to pass the
trademark legislation.82 The Court found nothing in the trademark legis-
lation limiting its regulation to “commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several states and with Indian tribes.”83 Accordingly, the
trademarks statutes were declared unconstitutional.84 It would be an-
other twenty-five years before Congress passed legislation permitting the
registration of marks used in interstate commerce.
C. THE INITIAL BROADENING OF TRADEMARK RIGHTS
During the twentieth century, the courts and Congress considerably ex-
panded trademark law to provide greater protection to brands as op-
posed to focusing primarily on protecting customers from illegitimate
76. Id. at 92.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.




82. Id. at 94-95.
83. Id. at 95, 97.
84. Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991). In Feist,
the Supreme Court reiterated the essential point made more than a century before, namely
that the Clause exacts originality and at least some minimal creativity as a condition of the
exclusive rights it allows Congress to confer on authors and inventors. See id.
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diversions.85 As Mark McKenna posits, the traditional concepts of “good-
will” and “likelihood of confusion” became the tools for the expansion of
trademark law such that consumers grew to expect that trademark own-
ers had increasingly broad control over their brands and marks.86 These
new consumer expectations led to even broader trademark rights spiral-
ing into greater expectations, spurred on by the help of marketers.87 In-
deed, what a company stands for in the eyes of its customers (i.e., the
ideals that its brands project) can serve as the most important factor in
the company’s future growth and profitability.88
The first step in this expansion of rights was the Trademark Act of 1905
permitting the federal registration of trademarks used in interstate com-
merce.89 The 1905 Act allowed the registration of marks that were inher-
ently distinctive, and excluded descriptive marks and trade dress,
regardless of their degree of acquired distinctiveness.90 Yet, the Act loos-
ened the requirement of direct competition by defining infringement as a
party’s use of the same or a similar mark as the plaintiff’s on goods of
substantially the same descriptive properties.91 Accordingly, this allowed
claims against uses for goods that were descriptively similar, even if the
proprietors did not directly compete with one another.92
Judge Learned Hand continued to apply this broad reading of the 1905
Act when the Second Circuit refused to allow the registration of the
“YALE” mark for flashlights and batteries when it was already used for
locks.93 According to Judge Hand, “it ha[d] come to be recognized that,
unless the borrower’s use is so foreign to the owner’s as to insure against
any identification of the two, it is unlawful.”94 Congress extended cover-
age to descriptive marks with secondary meaning in the 1920 Act and
continued to revise these acts over the next forty years.95
In 1946, Congress undertook a major overhaul of the federal trade-
mark law by enacting the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946.96 The Act
provides for federal registration of marks that are used in commerce and
for an array of remedies against parties who infringe on registered
marks.97 Trademark protection could extend to “word[s], name[s], sym-
85. McKenna, supra note 61, at 1896.
86. Id. at 1899.
87. Id.
88. See JIM STENGEL, GROW (2011).
89. Pub. L. No. 58-84, 33 Stat. 727 (1905), repealed by Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-
489, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 427, 444 (1946) (codified as amended in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
90. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 6.
91. See id.
92. See Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, 410 (2d Cir. 1917) (al-
lowing the owner of the Aunt Jemima’s mark for pancake batter to prevent the defendant’s
use of the same mark for pancake syrup).
93. Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
94. Id.
95. Act of Mar. 19, 1920, 41 Stat. 533.
96. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (2005). A national system of trademark registration provided ad-
vantages over state common law trademarks: First, a federally registered mark allows the
registrant to overcome any claims of later use by good faith users by giving nationwide
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bol[s], or devices, or any combination thereof.”98 Product design and
packing may constitute protectable trademarks.99 Even sounds, scents,
and colors may qualify for trademark protection.100 The expansion of
protection for marks outside traditional words and written media poten-
tially signaled a shift away from the earlier narrower view of trademarks
as naked source identifiers whose creativity was of little relevance.
According to the Act, such trademarks are protected under federal law
so long as they are “used by a person” in commerce in a distinctive way
“to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that
source is unknown.”101 This “anonymous source doctrine” signified a
move away from traditional trademark law since consumers only need to
recognize that a mark represents a single source, but do not need to know
the specific origin of the good at issue.102 The doctrine understands the
mark to be the thing consumers care about, not the source.103 It does not
matter who is manufacturing or providing the product so long as it bears
the appropriate mark, which carries with it information about the con-
sumer’s tastes and the producer’s reputation.104
The inherent distinctive quality of a mark is an important factor in
trademark law. Distinctiveness is traditionally measured on a scale de-
scribed by Judge Friendly (which became known as the Abercrombie
spectrum) as progressing from least to most distinctive, in terms of marks
that are: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or
fanciful.105 Judge Friendly noted that the ascending order reflected not
only “eligibility to trademark status,” but also “the degree of protection
accorded.”106 Marks are inherently distinctive if they are capable of iden-
tifying a unique source of that good or service when they are first used.107
Arbitrary or fanciful terms bear no relationship to the products or ser-
vices they describe and are “new coinage.”108 A suggestive mark requires
imagination, thought and perception to reach a conclusion as to the na-
ture of the goods. Marks that are not inherently distinctive, but are de-
scriptive of a particular good or service, can become distinctive if there is
constructive notice; second, federal registration provides an independent basis for federal
subject matter jurisdiction; and third, the statute conveys some additional rights, most no-
tably incontestability, which arguably gives a registrant rights beyond common law rights.
See id. The Act explicitly expands common law rights by allowing the registration of ser-
vice marks. See id.
98. § 1127.
99. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 209-16 (2000).
100. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162, 174 (1995).
101. § 1127.




105. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-12 (2d Cir. 1976).
106. Id. at 9.
107. See Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 791 (5th Cir.
1983), abrogated by 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
108. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11.
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proof of secondary meaning.109 Generic terms cannot receive trademark
protection, even if secondary meaning is established.110
Jeanne Fromer explains that arbitrary and fanciful marks reflect a level
of creativity in their design such that they are rewarded by receiving
greater protection.111 “Unlike creators, who receive no special cogni-
zance under trademark law, creativity itself is strongly encouraged. In
fact, in spite of Supreme Court and other pronunciations to the contrary,
encouraging creativity lies at the heart of trademark law and theory.”112
With respect to copyrights and patents, “problem finding” and “problem
solving” are recognized and valued such that their “protectability” em-
phasizes how well the problem was solved.113
Creativity is something central that patent and copyright law each
seeks to encourage, which is why it is vital to ensure that these laws
actually encourage creative work in their respective purviews. With
patent and copyright, the law seeks to encourage the creator to craft
something valuable.114
Creativity made its way into trademark law once trademark law moved
from protecting significations of a single known source to marks indicat-
ing a single, but typically unknown, source. Therefore the mark must be
linked—usually by creativity—to the underlying good to imprint it on the
consumer’s mind. Establishing this link is also an undertaking in
creativity.
According to psychologists, creativity is “a process that generates a
product or idea and possesses two qualities: newness and appropri-
ateness—appropriate in the sense that some community recognizes it
as socially valuable.” Trademark creation fits this schema of creativ-
ity. The creator here is, by definition, building something new: a link
between a mark and goods and services that has not previously ex-
isted. In the abstract, this link creation is socially appropriate, in that
trademark law seeks to benefit consumers and trade in innumerable
ways.115
The experience of Procter & Gamble (P&G) demonstrates the power
and profitability of establishing links that connect consumers with some-
thing they recognize as socially valuable in a new and different way.116
P&G created a link between Jif peanut butter and the mothers who were
typically the purchasers by exemplifying and incorporating the mothers’
values into its brand. The P&G protected slogan, “Choosy Mothers
Choose Jif,” linked the mothers’ values of healthfulness and nutrition to
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2005).
110. See Zatarain’s, 698 F.2d at 790-91.
111. See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1885, 1907-08 (2011).
112. Id. at 1902.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1905.
116. STENGEL, supra note 88, at 16.
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its product by advertising that its product was of high quality and that no
preservatives or toxins found on peanuts were used to make the prod-
uct.117 P&G further supported women’s value by contributing ten cents
from the sale of each jar to a local parent teacher association.118 By ex-
plicitly aligning and linking its business to the values of moms, P&G
achieved record market sales.119
This new and creatively driven role for brands demonstrates the way in
which creators of brands utilize the same type of processes and intellect
that is behind the development of copyrights and patents. Creativity is
required to establish the unique links between customers and the brand
that the seller wants its customer to experience. It is this experience that
will bring the customer back for more. It was more than one hundred
years ago that the Supreme Court drew a line of demarcation between
copyrights and patents based in large part on its conclusion that trade-
marks did not “depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work
of the brain. It requires no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious
thought.”120 Such conclusions may be turning into a thing of the past.
D. SPONSORSHIP CONFUSION
Infringement under the Lanham Act was intended to include any use
that was likely to cause confusion as to a potential connection between
the junior user and the mark owner.121 This involved not only confusion
about the actual source of the product but also as to the relationship or
affiliation between the mark’s owner and the junior user.122 Under this
scheme, the consumer’s belief as to any potential relationship between
the two parties affected the scope of the trademark owner’s rights.123
Allowing infringement claims for non-competitive uses represented a
shift in trademark law.124 The Lanham Act allowed claims based on the
argument that purchasers may be disappointed with the junior user’s
product and impute that disappointment to the mark’s owner, mistakenly
believing that there is some relationship. The senior user may lose future
sales or be impeded in its efforts to enter new markets.125 This shift al-
lowing trademark owners’ claims against noncompetitive uses reflected a
fundamental change in trademark theory and the need for the develop-
ment of factors for a court to consider in gauging the likelihood of confu-
sion in the case of noncompeting products.126
117. See id. at 15.
118. See id.
119. See id. at 16.
120. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879).
121. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946).
122. MCCARTHY, supra note 69 (explaining this approach and collecting cases).
123. McKenna, supra note 61, at 1902.
124. Id. at 1903.
125. Id.
126. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 140.
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Having jettisoned the requirement of competition, federal courts of ap-
peal and state courts began to develop tests for determining the likeli-
hood of confusion for noncompeting products.127 The most well-known
factors were set out in the Polaroid case: (1) the strength of the mark; (2)
the degree of similarity between the two marks; (3) the proximity of the
products or services; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will “bridge
the gap;” (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) the defendant’s good faith
(or bad faith) in adopting the mark in question; (7) the quality of the
defendant’s product or services; and (8) the sophistication of the buyer.128
The courts in essence ceased looking for a strong link between customer
confusion and the particular purchasing decision, and instead accepted as
actionable confusion regarding sponsorship or affiliation.129 The empha-
sis increasingly shifted from protecting the buyer to protecting the pro-
ducer’s goodwill. Thus, sponsorship confusion is another area in which
the law began to serve as a tool to safeguard broader functions of trade-
marks rather than its ability to minimize consumer search costs.
E. DILUTION
Congress expanded the scope of federal protection available to owners
of famous trademarks when it created a cause of action for dilution
through the 1995 Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). The goal of
the law was to provide a federal remedy against another person’s com-
mercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after
the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality
of the mark.130 The lack of competition or confusion is not determinative
under that provision.131 Some commentators considered this statute “the
most seismic change” to the evolution of trademark law.132
The concept of trademark dilution is a departure from traditional
trademark principles since such claims allow a mark holder to prevent a
third party from using the same mark even though there is no potential
confusion and no risk that there will be a diversion of customers.133 Be-
cause the Act protects against the dilution of the mark’s “distinctive qual-
ity,” trademark owners seeking protection under the Act must establish
that their marks possess a “distinctive quality” to state a claim for
dilution.134
The Dilution Act further differs from traditional trademark law in
that the class of entities for whose benefit the law was created is far
127. Id.
128. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
129. McKenna, supra note 61, at 1903-04.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2005).
131. TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’ns, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2001).
132. Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 MINN. L. REV. 769, 777 (2012).
133. McKenna, supra note 61, at 1914.
134. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A mark
that, notwithstanding its fame, has no distinctiveness is lacking the very attribute that the
anti-dilution statute seeks to protect.”).
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narrower. The action for infringement under the Lanham Act serves
the interests of consumers, as well as sellers, in having trademarks
function[] as source-identifiers. . . . In contrast, the Dilution Act is
designed solely for the benefit of sellers. Its purpose is to protect the
owners of famous marks from the kind of dilution that is permitted
by the trademark laws when a junior user uses the same mark in a
non-confusing way in an unrelated area of commerce. The Dilution
Act offers no benefit to the consumer public—only to the owner.135
The circuit courts split as to whether the FTDA required a plaintiff to
prove that the defendant’s unauthorized use had in fact caused dilution or
merely that such dilution was likely to occur.136 In 2003, the Supreme
Court resolved this split, holding in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.
that the law required a showing of actual dilution.137 In 2006, however,
Congress changed this when it enacted the Trademark Dilution Revision
Act (TDRA).138 Under that new and still current law, the owner of a
famous mark can obtain injunctive relief against an unauthorized use that
“is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment.”139 The
changes to dilution law were among the most important in the trademark
arena in recent memory, along with Congress’s enactment of laws that
sought to adapt existing frameworks to new technologies.140
F. CONFUSION OUTSIDE THE POINT OF SALE
1. Initial Interest Confusion
The expansion of trademark protection continued as the doctrines of
“initial interest confusion” and “post-sale confusion” developed.141 The
initial interest confusion doctrine protects brand reputation by preventing
others from shifting potential consumers’ attention—even if no actual
sales are diverted. The doctrine applies even when the confusion is re-
solved before the actual purchase.142 The post-sale confusion doctrine
135. TCPIP Holding Co., 244 F.3d at 93. This Article argues, however, that consumers
may in fact receive benefits from dilution law as well. See infra Section IV.B.
136. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 222.
137. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 419 (2003).
138. Trademark Dilution Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. See, e.g., Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), Pub. L. No. 106-
113, 113 Stat. 1536 (1999). With the proliferation of transactions on the Internet, Congress
believed that protection was needed to ensure that parties were not using the trademark
names of others in domain names that confused or misled consumers or undermined the
selling power of the marks. The ACPA defined with greater clarity the circumstances in
which registration, use, or trafficking in a domain name that resembled a valid trademark
violates the rights of owners and established procedures for enforcing those rights even
when the infringer is beyond the personal jurisdiction of the courts.
141. “Initial interest confusion” and “post-sale confusion” have been traced to the 1962
amendments to § 2 of the Lanham Act that removed references to “purchasers,” and to the
recognition that the Act also protects trademark owners in addition to consumers. In both
instances, trademark protection has expanded to protect marks where there is no source
confusion, but instead injury, or potential injury, to the goodwill that the mark owner has
developed in its mark. This is especially true in cases involving the Internet.
142. Brookfield Commc’n, Inc. v. West Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir.
1999).
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seeks to avoid uninterested third parties’ confusion from knock-off
goods; it allows firms to protect the prestige of trademarks and brands.
According to Deven Desai, these doctrines are unmitigated brand protec-
tion premised on the “corporate” view of brands, which endows the
mark’s owner with most or all of the power to dictate mark usage and
meaning.143
With the advent of the Internet, the number of cases involving initial
interest confusion has risen significantly.144 At least seven circuits recog-
nize initial interest confusion as a valid basis for an infringement claim
involving the unauthorized use of trademarks or service marks in
metatags or keyword advertising.145 Many infringement claims have
arisen from the unauthorized use of trademarks in domain names and in
metatags, the computer code embedded in a website.146 A junior user of a
mark may divert consumers to its website by incorporating the familiar
trademark into its domain name or metatags so that a search engine re-
turns the junior user’s cite as relevant to the user’s search, as happened in
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v West Coast Entertainment Corp. This
was one of the first Internet cases to invoke the doctrine.147
The Lanham Act limits trademark infringement and unfair competition
actions to circumstances in which the defendant’s use of another mark, or
an imitation of that mark, is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mis-
take, or to deceive.”148 Jennifer Rothman makes the argument that the
Lanham Act’s goal to protect consumers is limited to preventing “diver-
sion” in the context of deception and should not extend when another
business, competing or non-competing, simply provides customers with
other purchase options.149
Many courts treat the initial interest confusion test as separate and dis-
tinct from the traditional “likelihood of confusion” analysis, thereby in-
creasing the prospect that a given defendant will be found liable for
143. Desai, supra note 102, at 992-999.
144. Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 109 (2005). “Prior to the consideration of
trademark infringement online, the initial interest confusion doctrine only rarely appeared
as the basis for finding trademark infringement—there were fewer than a dozen published
cases relying on the doctrine before 1990. In dramatic contrast, between 1990 and today
there have been more than 100 published cases considering ‘initial interest confusion.’” Id.
at 109-10.
145. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 173. Some courts do not reach the question of initial
interest confusion because they conclude as a threshold inquiry that such activities do not
involve trademark use within the meaning of the Lanham Act.
146. Id. at 167.
147. Brookfield Commc’n., Inc. v. West Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F. 3d 1036, 1057-58 (9th
Cir. 1999) (holding that the doctrine of initial interest confusion could be used to find
trademark infringement even if there was no likelihood of confusion). The defendant was
liable for infringement because the plaintiff’s “Moviebuff” trademark appeared in the
metatags for defendant’s website. The court concluded that despite the lack of source con-
fusion, there was initial interest confusion in that the defendant was using “Moviebuff” “to
divert people looking for ‘MovieBuff’ to its web site . . . improperly benefit[ing] from the
goodwill that [plaintiff] developed in its mark.” See id. at 1062.
148. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2005).
149. Rothman, supra note 144, at 125-26.
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trademark infringement.150 Mark McKenna sees these types of cases as
involving “treat[ing] a trademark itself as the exclusive property of a
mark owner . . . . Such cases lose sight of the fundamental distinction
courts traditionally drew between attempts to divert trade (competition)
and attempts to divert trade through deception.”151 This does not resolve
the question of which timeframe is relevant for the deception to occur,
however, and the courts who have recognized claims of initial interest
confusion have drawn the answer more broadly. While initial interest
confusion partly fits into the framework of protecting consumer search
costs, there is no question that the doctrine departs from the original his-
torical understanding that focused on deception at the moment of sale.
2. Post-Sale Confusion
The post-sale confusion doctrine goes one step further in protecting
trademark owners from confusion in the minds of non-purchasers. The
consumer experiencing post-sale confusion is not the one who made the
purchase, but instead a potential purchaser who might mistakenly associ-
ate the inferior-quality work of the junior user with the senior user and
therefore refuse to buy from the senior user in the future.152 The fact that
there is no confusion at the point of sale does not negate the possibility of
post-sale confusion.153
McKenna sees post-sale confusion as “quite radically different [from]
traditional trademark law. Rather than focusing on consumers actively
searching for a potential producer, liability . . . turn[s] on the possibility of
confusion among casual observers—individuals about whom we have no
reliable information with respect to future purchasing potential.”154 Al-
though some courts characterize the post-sale confusion doctrine as an
example of trade diversion, the end result of cases adopting the post-sale
confusion doctrine is to assure a trademark owner that only it will reap
the benefits of its desirable products.155
Jeremy Sheff points out in his critique of the doctrine that the Supreme
Court has never endorsed this theory or even discussed it, although cir-
cuit courts have recognized it.156 Sheff breaks down the post-sale doctrine
into three distinct types of cases—each designed in his view to regulate
“socially expressive consumption.”157 “Bystander confusion” refers to ob-
servers who see the purchase of a non-confused buyer and mistake the
product for that of the plaintiff claiming trademark infringement.158 This
was the situation in Payless Shoesource v. Reebok, wherein Reebok con-
150. Id. at 141-142.
151. McKenna, supra note 61, at 1906-07 (emphasis added).
152. LAFRANCE, supra note 32, at 173.
153. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 804 F. Supp. 206, 212 (D. Kan.
1992), vacated by 998 F.2d 985 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
154. McKenna, supra note 61, at 1908.
155. Id.
156. Sheff, supra note 132, at 772-73.
157. Id. at 773.
158. Id. at 774.
2016] Branded 733
tended that the confusion occurred when a consumer observed someone
wearing a pair of Payless shoes and believed that the shoes were
Reebok’s.159 The bystander consumer may attribute any inferior quality
to Reebok, and this would damage Reebok’s reputation.160 Problems
with such claims can arise as courts link together a chain of inferences
required to find bystander confusion, rather than holding plaintiffs to
prove “likely confusion.”161 Sheff describes this as “downstream confu-
sion,” where there is the risk that a non-confused purchaser of a knockoff
might try to sell or resell the goods to a confused recipient.162 Although
this claim may be in some tension with precedent regarding contributory
negligence and trademark law’s first sale doctrine, such claims have been
recognized.163
The last theory, “status confusion,” owes its origins to Thorstein Veb-
len, an economist and social critic who argued that “individuals conspicu-
ously consume some expensive products (Fendi handbags, say) to stake
claim to social status.”164 If such symbols are overused or available to
many, their value is driven down.165 The “purchasers of such goods are
not purchasing a level of product quality associated with the brand, but
are rather purchasing the social status that is accorded those who possess
products bearing the brand.”166 What Sheff finds remarkable about these
claims is that the focus is on what it tells us about people, not what it tells
us about the trademarked product.167
Thus, the information asymmetry that trademarks are called on to
mitigate in the status-confusion cases is not between buyers and sell-
ers of goods bearing Veblen brands—genuine or counterfeit. Rather,
the asymmetry is between purchasers of goods bearing Veblen
brands—genuine or counterfeit—and their social audience. The in-
formation as to which the asymmetry exists is not ultimately about
the product at all, but about the social status of the person consum-
ing it.168
As the above discussion demonstrates, trademarks have evolved from
being solely a source indicator of goods to a medium of communication
that provide buyers with a new and different understanding and experi-
159. Payless Shoesource, 804 F. Supp. at 212.
160. Id.
161. Sheff, supra note 132, at 778-785.
162. Id. at 774.
163. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). Limiting con-
tributory trademark infringement liability to those cases where the defendant intentionally
induces infringement or continues to supply its products to one he knows, or has reason to
believe, is engaging in trademark infringement. See also Sheff, supra note 132, at 786.
164. Sheff, supra note 132, at 774.
165. Id. at 775. Sheff refers to luxury trademarks that serve this socially expressive func-
tion as “Veblen brands.”
166. Id. at 792.
167. Id. at 792. Sheff raises the question of whether trademark law is designed to care
whether a purchaser of luxury goods must suffer a lower degree of status because the
degree of exclusivity is reduced or whether unspecified observers are now unable to relia-
bly determine the social status of purchasers. See id. at 793.
168. Id. at 803.
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ence of products that are being sold. Brands, and trademarks as part of
them, lead consumers to purchase products that have been designed and
marketed to invoke experiences and feelings in the minds of the consum-
ers that influence what products they buy and how they experience the
products. Consumers send messages about themselves through the me-
dium of trademarks and seek social status through the same. The Su-
preme Court once perceived trademarks as an afterthought of our
Founding Fathers when it came to the Constitution—at least in the sense
of not finding explicit mention in the document, unlike other forms of
intellectual property—but these legal devices have now taken on a new
role and prominence in our market-driven society. The next Part will ex-
amine in detail how trademarks provide three kinds of incentives that
developed over time and how future changes in the law must consider
possible repercussions in this context.
IV. EXPERIENCES AND INCENTIVES IN TRADEMARKS
Trademarks received their separate status in intellectual property well
before the world of mass marketing and strategic branding existed in
which trademarks drive virtually all aspects of product design and devel-
opment, including how products are seen and experienced. Trademarks
are now parts of “brands” designed after extensive research and input
about consumers, their values, their buying habits, and their subconscious
preferences. Success is determined by the degree of imagination and crea-
tivity that marketers can bring to link the company’s trademark to the
values and feelings of the consumers that they hope to persuade to buy
their products.
In the days of the Trade-Mark Cases, the Supreme Court announced
that trademarks did not require “creativity,” and therefore were simply
not in the same category as copyrights and patents that the Founding Fa-
thers deemed to be “special” and worthy of their own clause in our new
Constitution. Unlike copyrights and patents, which are presumed to in-
volve innovation and newness, trademarks were viewed as something
“less,” only arising from their “mere use” in identifying the source of a
product. Much has changed in the over 100 years since then, and the crea-
tivity and “work of the brain,” which the Supreme Court found lacking in
the Trade-Mark Cases, is frequently present in the creation of today’s
trademarks.
Marketers today create brands that inspire emotions and exper-
iences,169 not unlike those we experience when we hear a familiar copy-
righted song. The most successful brands have used creative strategies,
including advertising, for connecting their products with fundamental
human values. In our current economic world, these creative brands, and
the way in which consumers experience them, have become the “prod-
169. See Mario Biagioli et al., Brands R Us, in THE LUXURY ECONOMY AND INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY 77, 91 (Haochen Sun et al. eds. 2015) (“Brands move from the realm of
logic to the realm of emotion.”). See generally Desai, supra note 102.
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uct” that trademark laws protect. Given the role that creativity and the
work of the brain play in brand development, the law must reflect this
development, especially when the possibility of legal changes arises.
A. CREATIVITY, “BRAIN POWER,” AND TRADEMARKS
Companies invest significant time, energy, and resources in developing,
enhancing, and protecting their brands, and at times the trademarked ele-
ments they contain have become the most significant assets of many
corporations.
Of all the assets any company owns, its brand is the single most valu-
able. A bold statement?  Sure. But think about it: A brand is the
only corporate asset that, managed well and properly, will never de-
preciate. Never depreciate. Those are magic words. Patents expire,
software ages, buildings crumble, roofs leak, machines break, and
trucks wear out. But a well-managed brand can increase in value
year after year after year. That’s jaw dropping.170
Because of the value and importance of brands, companies invest heav-
ily in the development of their trademarks and in a level of creativity that
rivals the creativity required for copyrights and patents; this includes in-
vestments into advertising, which is ultimately hard to disentangle from
other aspects of the identity of a mark. The manner in which trademarks
link products to the hoped-for consumers has become an exercise in un-
derstanding fundamental human values and developing brands that speak
to consumers at emotional levels and motivate them to become brand
loyalists. Behind these strategies is not only extensive consumer research,
but also innovative and unique approaches connecting brands to
consumers.
These creative “links” arise in many different ways.171 One path is
through a unique and suggestive mark that associates aspects of the prod-
ucts to needs of the consumers. Or, creativity may come from the creation
of a new word that enters our vocabulary because it ties together aspects
of the product in a new and different way, just as Fitbit has done. Creativ-
ity may also come in the form of trade dress (i.e., the manner in which
products are packaged or displayed) that has taken on an aspect of crea-
tivity minimized by the Supreme Court at the time of the Trade-Mark
Cases. Studies reveal that behind this creativity are fundamental ideals
that drive human behavior—ideals into which businesses tap to develop
successful brands.
170. STEVE MCKEE, POWER BRANDING 2 (2014). According to an annual study by In-
terbrand, a leading global branding consultant, Coca-Cola’s brand is worth more than $75
billion—and that figure is for its brand alone rather than including any physical assets. See
id. According to the same study, McDonald’s brand is worth more than $40 billion and
Toyota, BMW, and Mercedes hover around $30 billion each. See id.
171. Fromer, supra note 111 (examining the way in which the law provides enhanced
protection for “distinctive” marks after trademark law moved from protecting significa-
tions of a single known source to a single but unknown source, where establishing a link is
viewed as an exercise in creativity).
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For instance, studies of global brands reveal that the most successful
brands connect with people at a much different level than simply as
source identifiers, which was the Supreme Court’s early limited view of
trademarks. The data from a ten-year-growth study of more than 50,000
brands around the world showed that companies with brands focused on
improving people’s lives outperformed the market by a huge margin. The
data also indicated that an investment in the top fifty businesses in the
study would have been 400 times more profitable than an investment in
the S&P 500.172
The business case for brand ideals is not about altruism or corporate
social responsibility. It’s about expressing a business’s fundamental
reason for being and powering its growth. It’s about linking and
leveraging the behaviors of all the people important to a business’s
future, because nothing unites and motivates people’s actions as
strongly as ideals. They make it possible to connect what happens
inside a business with what happens outside it, especially in the
“black box” of people’s minds and how they make decisions. Ideals
are the ultimate drivers . . . of category-leading growth.173
When a consumer thinks about something, including a word or image
signifying a brand, a network of associations is developed in the neural
pathways of the brain. These pathways remain active with decreasing sen-
sitivity for a period of time, making it easier to trigger pathways that have
been recently activated. So if a person identifies a word such as “explore”
more readily after seeing one brand’s name than another, it indicates that
the person associates the quality of exploration more strongly with one
brand than another and therefore is more drawn to the brand that exudes
her personal ideal.174
Companies encourage consumers to see a brand as having a personality
and want consumers to connect with the brand in a deep and personal
way. William McEwen identified five ways that a brand can have a per-
sonal meaning: as a sign of prestige (for example, the status of carrying a
Louis Vuitton purse); a personal quality (such as demonstrating out-
doorsmanship by wearing L.L. Bean boots); membership (like the club
aspect of owning a Harley-Davidson motorcycle); memory trippers (asso-
ciating Moet & Chandon with a special family occasion); and self-comple-
tion (such as L’Ore´al being a sign that you are worth spending more
on).175 Buying branded goods is one way that consumers build that con-
nection and satisfy those personal needs.
A look at how the most successful companies have tapped into the
human values of their customers demonstrates the type of creative think-
ing at the heart of today’s trademarks, which are a key part of brands.
According to Stengel, successful brands like Google exist to satisfy our
172. STENGEL, supra note 88, at 7, 9-10.
173. Id. at 11.
174. Id. at 40.
175. WILLIAM J. MCEWEN, MARRIED TO THE BRAND: WHY CONSUMERS BOND WITH
SOME BRANDS FOR LIFE 36-38 (2005).
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curiosity, IBM’s ideal is to build a smarter planet, and other brands pro-
vide customers with a special experience that enhances life, like Moet &
Chandon, whose ideal is to transform occasions into celebrations. Even
Pampers is not about selling diapers—its brand ideal is to help parents
care for babies’ and toddlers’ healthy and happy development.
Upon examining fifty high-performing companies, Stengel found a
commonality of brand ideals. The brand ideals of the highest-growth busi-
nesses center around one of five “fundamental human values:”
ELICITING JOY: Activating experiences of happiness, wonder, and lim-
itless possibility.
ENABLING CONNECTION: Enhancing the ability of people to connect
with one another and the world in meaningful ways.
INSPIRING EXPLORATION: Helping people explore new horizons and
new experiences.
EVOKING PRIDE: Giving people increased confidence, strength, secur-
ity, and vitality.
IMPACTING SOCIETY: Affecting society broadly, including by challeng-
ing the status quo and redefining categories.176
To reach their customers at the human value level, companies combine
the new implicit measures that modern neuroscience makes available
with traditional methods of measuring people’s conscious associations.177
The bottom line is that ideals motivate individuals at their most funda-
mental levels.178 Neuroscience-based measures of subconscious attitudes,
thoughts, and feelings demonstrate how brand ideals motivate consumers
and power the growth of companies. Understanding such factors and re-
flecting them in a company’s brand is an exercise that involves a high
degree of creativity and work of the brain. Put in the words of a re-
nowned CEO of a French luxury goods company, “Star brands only stem
from an artistic and creative mind.”179
So what is behind those artistic and creative minds? How do they cre-
ate these successful brands? What is the creative process at work? Ac-
cording to the research undertaken by Stengel and his colleagues, these
business artists share five common traits and excel at: (1) Discovering and
rediscovering a brand ideal that connects with a fundamental human
value; (2) Building the business around that ideal; (3) “Communicating
that ideal internally and externally to engage employees and customers”;
(4) “Delivering a near-ideal customer experience”; and (5) “Evaluating
business progress and people against the ideal.”180 This takes place
through a number of mechanisms, including advertising.181 The brand
makes up a whole of which the mark itself forms an integral part. The
176. STENGEL, supra note 88, at 38-39.
177. See id. at 40.
178. See id.
179. Id. at 52 (quoting Bernard Arnault, CEO of French luxury conglomerate LVMH).
180. Id. at 54.
181. Some have noted the possible risk, however, that advertising and marketing—as
encouraged by intellectual property—may dissipate social value. See, e.g., Mark A. Lem-
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ways in which we protect trademark law thus have the power to influence
the mechanisms through which branding can take place.
Stengel is not the only expert in branding who recognizes the impor-
tance of developing brand strategies that connect with customers at a
deeper level:
The best brands do their best to ensure that every contact with their
company offers a psychic reward, not just a physical one. Find out
what your customers really value. Never violate their trust or sense
of security. Make it your objective to build not only short-term trans-
actions but long-term affection as well.182
Other experts in branding explain that the creativity they bring is their
focus on “link[ing] their services to the users’ daily routine and emotions”
to form habits such that the consumer becomes “hooked.”183 The poten-
tial of a product to create a habit includes the evaluation of frequency,
that is, how often the behavior occurs, and the perceived utility, or how
useful and rewarding the behavior is in the user’s mind over alternative
solutions.184 The perceived utility is an evaluation of how the brand
solves a problem. The company’s hook is designed to creatively manifest
itself on the consumer’s mind through daily habits so that the consumer
will turn to the company to solve the problem.185
There can be little doubt that today’s brands reflect a high degree of
creativity and brain power with regard to their development. No longer
are the trademarks that they contain merely “source identifiers.” They
have now, together with other branding elements, become creatively de-
signed vehicles for companies to connect with consumers’ deep-seated
human values. If the Supreme Court evaluated trademarks today, while
the constitutional outcome of the Trade-Mark Cases likely would not
change for other reasons, the Court may conclude that trademarks can
demonstrate a similar degree of creativity to that present behind the de-
velopment of copyrights and patents. The similarities do not stop there.
Because trademarks seek to activate consumers’ ideals and human emo-
tions, many trademarks are now experienced at a level not unlike the one
related to copyrighted works or patented inventions. These similarities
merit further examination.
ley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1063 (2005)
(citation omitted).
182. MCKEE, supra note 170, at 26.
183. NIR EYAL, HOOKED 3 (2014).
184. Id. at 29.
185. See Jeanne Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV.
1441 (2010). This is similar to the world of patents and copyrights wherein copyrights and
patents are recognized and valued to the extent that they are “problem finding” and “prob-
lem solving.”
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B. EXPERIENCING BRANDS, COPYRIGHTS, AND PATENTS
The infusion of creativity into branding brings the experience of a
brand closer and closer to the way we experience a copyrighted movie or
book:
The best branding, like a beautiful painting or well-crafted movie,
should be stirring, moving, thought provoking, even uplifting. Must it
be strategic? Of course—but even the best strategy won’t compen-
sate the lack of imagination.186
One never asks whether creativity sells when it comes to movies or
books or art. Of course, it does. And the same is true when it comes to
brands. One common factor in branding effectiveness is creating trust—
trust that the product or service will meet a need, and trust that it will be
of value. According to McKee, a proven way to create this trust is
through creativity. Trust is based in familiarity and chemistry. Behind
every sale are factors beyond objective criteria, but ones that involve
some level of good feelings.187
So how do consumers experience trademarks? Since marketers now fo-
cus on brand development that is aimed at invoking human emotions and
“good feelings,” how do these emotions play into purchasing decisions
and brand loyalty? Stengel’s research reflects the fact that these deeper
and more complex emotions are behind purchasing decisions. While
human beings like to believe that their decisions are objective and dispas-
sionate, research reveals that they are in fact influenced by emotional and
instinctive reactions.188 Marketers design trademarks to tap into those
emotional and subconscious reactions to affect directly the manner in
which trademarks are experienced. Stengel’s research looks into the as-
sociations that brands as a whole activate in consumers’ minds, finding
that the “highest growth businesses are run by business artists, leaders
whose primary medium is brand ideals.”189
When consumers experience products, they are to some degree exper-
iencing the “brand” that has been planted in their subconscious minds
through the marketing that the company has designed and that includes
images, slogans, sounds, colors, and packaging. Consumers’ experiences
are oftentimes influenced by neurological responses that have developed
because of the associations between the brands and these marketing tech-
niques, as well as a number of other factors such as consumers’ memories
associated with particular brands.190 When consumers see a familiar
186. MCKEE, supra note 170, at 124 (emphasis added).
187. Id.
188. STENGEL, supra note 88, at 36. This is the “power of thinking without thinking”
that Malcolm Gladwell described in his work. See MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE
POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING (2007). For a critique of the book, see Richard
A. Posner, Blinkered, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 24, 2005), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
blinkered [https://perma.cc/6L8M-C24G].
189. Stengel, supra note 88, at 36.
190. I have described these phenomena in more detail in previous work. See Irina D.
Manta, Hedonic Trademarks, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 246 (2013).
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brand, these neural pathways in the brain are more readily triggered and
influence the consumers’ expectations, experience, and ultimately their
buying decision.
One interesting piece of evidence is the 2009 Caltech study that
demonstrated that people believe expensive wines taste better, even
when the prices of Cabernets ranging from $5 to $90 were randomly
mixed.191 Similarly, consumers “prefer” Coke to Pepsi even when they
are unwittingly drinking Pepsi.192 Specifically:
Neuroscience research shows that brands convey emotional content
as well as information about product characteristics, and that people
react to their favorite brands in ways that mirror their reaction to
religious icons. This is why, despite the fact that people tend to pre-
fer Pepsi over Coke in blind taste tests, those exposed to the brand
names during the test tend to prefer Coke: exposure to the Coca-
Cola brand stimulates a region of the brain not stimulated in blind
taste tests.193
Martin Lindstrom has plumbed the depth of neuroscience by studying
brain scans related to reactions to specific brands, not simply to products,
in an effort to explore and explain what the concept of brands really
means to our brain.194 He confirmed that brands were recognizable and
strong, and that they activated different areas of consumers’ brains.195
While many react negatively to the idea of brain scans and their use in
marketing, the reality is that much is revealed about brands by tracking
areas of the brain that register increased activity when presented with
brands that marketers have imbued with qualities calling out to funda-
mental human values.196 Although we like to think that we act rationally
and report true and honest responses about our purchasing decisions,
most of us regularly engage in behavior for which we have no clear-cut
explanations.197 It is within this world that brands exist and are exper-
ienced by consumers. And brain scans do not lie—from the consumers’
vantage point, all experiences, even those that they cannot logically ex-
plain, are part of how their minds react to and interpret brands.
Consumers now experience brands, including their trademarked ele-
ments, in ways that satisfy fundamental human needs and desires de-
scribed by Stengel as those that are eliciting joy, enabling connections,
inspiring exploration, evoking pride, and impacting society.198 But is this
not the same way that consumers experience a painting or a novel or a
song? Creators of copyrighted songs try to evoke a memory or an event
191. MCKEE, supra note 170, at 31.
192. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke?
Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L. J. 2055, 2081 (2012).
193. Id.
194. See MARTIN LINDSTROM, BUYOLOGY: TRUTH AND LIES ABOUT WHY WE BUY
123–26 (2008).
195. See id.
196. Id. at 4.
197. Id. at 19.
198. See supra Part I.
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or a special feeling in the person hearing it. No doubt, particular areas of
the brain are stimulated as consumers experience the song. Every Sun-
day, when football fans hear the “NFL Theme” song that introduces the
weekly game, they experience an array of emotions. The song is designed
to cause ardent fans to feel excitement and anticipation, to conjure up
memories and emotions of games past, and to project passion and hopes
onto the upcoming game. All of this is how fans “experience” this copy-
righted song—whether consciously or subconsciously.
What about a poem? The poet has infused his poem with words that
allow the reader to imagine and to see beauty or to feel and experience
emotions including love, anger, excitement, and loss. How did Samuel
Butler want his readers to experience his copyrighted poem “I Fall
Asleep.”199 One may argue that he was pulling on the same strings of
fundamental human values that the creators of brands are trying to tug:
I fall asleep in the full and certain hope
That my slumber shall not be broken;
And that though I be all-forgetting,
Yet shall I not be all-forgotten,
But continue that life in the thoughts and deeds
Of those I loved.200
This experience becomes an interactive one in that brands can also fa-
cilitate self-expression. People can display some values or attach them-
selves to social groups by acquiring goods with brands that exemplify
those values or are popular among specific segments of the population.201
To the extent that self-expression is beneficial, this function of brands
may promote happiness.202
Given that brands are developed through creativity and experienced on
emotional levels, the differences when one compares trademarks to copy-
rights and patents seem to be evaporating. The next question to examine
is the extent to which brands, including their trademarks, incentivize their
creators just as copyrights and patents do.
C. THE INCENTIVIZING FUNCTIONS OF BRANDS
As mentioned, it has been commonly thought that the purpose of pat-
ent and copyright law is to incentivize innovation and creativity on the
part of artists, musicians, authors, inventors, and similar imaginatively-
199. SAMUEL BUTLER, I FALL ASLEEP (2005).
200. Id.
201. As Taio Cruz makes it a point to state in his song “Dynamite” (2009): “I’m wear-
ing all my favorite brands brands brands brands (Yeah).” TAIO CRUZ, DYNAMITE (Island
Records 2009).
202. But see Sheff, supra note 132, 775 (arguing that some people’s self-expression
comes at the expense of other people’s who are limited from using the brands). See also
Haochen Sun, Can Louis Vuitton Dance with Hiphone? Rethinking the Idea of Social Jus-
tice in Intellectual Property Law, 15 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 389 (2012) (discussing the
relationship between trademark law, luxury goods, and social justice).
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inclined others.203 For many years, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars dif-
ferentiated trademark law on the basis that trademarks carried no incen-
tivizing function.204 This mindset, however, appears to be quite outdated
in light of the creativity and ingenuity it takes to create a successful
brand—and trademark as part of that—and the manner in which brands
are experienced, as discussed above. What incentivizing functions does
trademark law carry now that the focus is on the brand and not the prod-
uct? And how do these incentives compare to those that drive the cre-
ators of copyrights and patents?
1. Creating a Unique Trademark in and of Itself
There is something to be said about the feeling one gets after making
something new, different, exciting, and unique; it is exhilarating to have
creation and innovation at one’s fingertips. The pinnacle of those feelings
often comes when the public adopts one’s creation and integrates it into
daily life and everyday vocabulary. Such is the case with Fitbit, as men-
tioned above. Before James Park and Eric Friedman, the founders and
creators of the Fitbit company, came along, no one ever uttered the word
Fitbit. Yet today, because of the imagination, creativity, and hard work of
Park and Friedman, Fitbit is used without confusion in casual conversa-
tion.205 Consumers associate Fitbit with health, wellness, and weight loss
as soon as they hear those two familiar syllables. To individuals with an
entrepreneurial spirit, like Park and Friedman, having one’s unique crea-
tion adopted is an important incentive for coming up with interesting,
meaningful, useful trademarked product—for which the creators will re-
ceive protection under trademark law. Indeed, the incentive to create
such goods is undoubtedly stronger when control over the term and con-
nection with a particular product is associated with it, rather than when
people will associate the term with all products that loosely fall into this
category of trackers as a generic matter.
Netflix is another example of how words that were creatively joined
produced a new expression that represents a novel brand idea.206 Netflix
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
204. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L.
REV. 1745 (2012) (building the case for expanding the concept of intellectual property’s
incentives to include expressive incentives as well as traditional pecuniary ones by drawing
parallels to literature on law and norms and expressive theories of the law). Fromer seeks
to examine the incentivizing aspects of intellectual property but focuses on copyrights and
patents, rather than trademarks as is the case here. See id.
205. For a discussion of the work and research that goes into naming products, see John
Colapinto, Famous Names, NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2011/10/03/famous-names [https://perma.cc/6HSM-6GMY]; Susan Krashinsky, The
art—and science—of creating a brand name, GLOBE & MAIL (May 29, 2014), http://www
.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/marketing/the-art-and-science-of-
creating-a-brand-name/article18915415/ [https://perma.cc/G2GR-SRKC].
206. Ken Favaro, Netflix Wasn’t All Wrong, STRATEGY + BUSINESS (Apr. 2, 2012), http:/
/www.strategy-business.com/article/cs00003?gko=b2e51 [https://perma.cc/7MGS-H6QQ].
Netflix also experienced a backlash from its loyal customer base when it attempted to
introduce the brand “Qwikster” for the DVD-by-mail arm of the company. The decision
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launched in 1997 as a DVD rental by mail service and experienced the
excitement and satisfaction of seeing its new name and brand become
used in everyday parlance to represent its products.
Netflix had built its brand on being an innovative, consumer-centric
company that revolutionized the way movies were rented. It allowed
people to move from the inconvenient bricks-and-mortar chain store
model to one with online, assisted selection; home delivery of DVDs
in an iconic red envelope; and, most importantly, no returns, no late
fees, and no “library fine”–style guilt.207
The innovative brand and its created name were built on those attrib-
utes and conveyed those qualities to its loyal subscriber base.208
Similar to the way in which Netflix successfully created a new expres-
sion, SoulCycle is another instance of a business linking two unrelated
terms to create a new word and brand idea in the mind of consumers.
SoulCycle is a company offering indoor cycling classes across the United
States.209 Its brand is built on the idea that exercise is a mode to
strengthen not only one’s body, but more importantly, one’s mind and
soul.210 In 2006, the company opened its first studio in New York City.211
Through its creative and innovate idea of linking indoor cycling classes
with empowering riders, providing inspirational coaching, and generating
a positive community, SoulCycle’s product successfully resonated with
consumers. Just nine years after opening with a single studio, SoulCycle
now has over forty-five studios across the country with plans to expand
internationally. When consumers today hear “SoulCycle,” a word that
had never existed before, they conjure thoughts of exercise, fitness, and
self-empowerment, all as a result of the creativity and innovation behind
the creation of the brand.
Trademark and brand creators may also be incentivized by the satisfac-
tion that comes from finding and solving a problem by bringing to the
market something that is novel and different not only in terms of the new
words or phrases they may create, but with regard to the unique problem
they solve. P&G tapped into this incentivizing function when it redis-
covered its Downy brand, which led to centering the product on eliciting
joy (one of the fundamental human values identified by Stengel) through
new scents, packaging, and consumer communications.212 In Latin
America, P&G saw that access to water was the biggest problem that low-
income women faced in embracing the P&G brand and was incentivized
to create a new brand that would make their lives easier and provide a
was quickly reversed as customers loyal to Netflix did not want any change to the brand
name.
207. Id.
208. Id. Netflix has now broadened its brand by becoming a streamer of online content
through licensing deals.
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“more re-creative, senses-renewing experience.”213 The result was a new
“brand,” called “Downy Single Rinse,” which utilized less water.214 It
made a positive difference in the lives of women in Latin America and
other low-income markets around the world.215 “It added extra impetus
to the Downy’s team efforts, as well as helped to motivate P&G employ-
ees in general.”216
The incentive to create something new and different may come in the
form of a commitment to environmental sustainability that is reflected in
innovative packaging and authentic-appearing messaging. San Francisco-
based Method “produce[s] surface cleaners and soaps made from non-
toxic, mostly natural ingredients, like coconut oil and plants, and pack-
age[s] them in sleek modern bottles that people want to display in their
kitchens and bathroom[s].”217 In 2000, the founders of the company “in-
troduced eco-friendly Method, a line of colorful cleaning agents with
fruity or flowery scents like ‘ginger yuzu,’ and sold them in these curva-
ceous, often clear bottles.”218 They tied their unique packaging with their
message of “going green” to build their brand loyalty. They have com-
bined their branding with a message of environmental sustainability:
The company tries to engender brand loyalty through its online ef-
forts. It provides more detailed information about its sustainability
initiatives on its website and hopes the message will spread through
word- of-mouth promotion from its loyal customers. Method also has
recruited an army of advocates online called “People Against Dirty,”
who join campaigns the company starts such as its call for more
transparent labeling of household cleaning products. “A lot of peo-
ple will come in for the design and the fragrance,” Ryan says, “but
it’s the sustainability that will ultimately build the loyalty.”219
One can see how trademarks and brands can build fan bases both 1) in
their names and images, the latter of which also drives people to visit
museums and exhibits related to branding and advertising,220 and 2) with
the way the brand becomes part of a larger creative effort that drives
other values such as social equality or environmental sustainability.
Changes to trademark law will therefore implicate potential effects on a
whole host of frequently unexplored aspects of branding of this sort
rather than simply on the functions of source identification, advertising,
and quality guarantee.




217. Kelly K. Spors, The Method Vision: Green Consumers Want to Have Fun, Too,




220. See, e.g., MUSEUM OF BRANDS, PACKAGING & ADVERTISING, http://www.museum
ofbrands.com/ [https://perma.cc/96JT-FQCH] (presenting information about this London-
based museum).
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2. Creating a New and Unique Experience
Brand creators may also be motivated to generate unique and new ex-
periences for consumers and to enhance the overall quality of consumers’
experience:
Everything your business does comes together with the ideals-in-
spired experience . . . provide[d] to customers. It’s not only your
product and service but how people learn about it, buy it, use it, live
with it, and share the quality of the experience with others.221
The way consumers experience brands reflects a complex interplay be-
tween the messages conveyed through brand image and the manner in
which the brand is imprinted in the consumers’ minds and retrieved when
the trademarked brand reappears.222 This ability to create something new
that will affect consumers is likely a significant motivator and incentive
for a trademark creator, yet one that commentators have often
overlooked.
Given that today’s trademarks are, like patents and copyrights, built on
creativity and experienced on many similar emotional levels, they more
rightfully should be considered siblings of copyrights and patents rather
than distant cousins. Scholars who have examined the question of the re-
lationship between patent and copyright law and their protectability stan-
dards have generally omitted trademarks in their analysis:
[T]he comparison of patent and copyright law offers insight into the
general role of intellectual property law and demonstrates what, if
anything, patent and copyright law can teach one another. Using the
same theoretical approach to explain or challenge their dissimilari-
ties indicates that, at their foundation, patent and copyright law have
more in common than legal scholarship often appreciates, instead
viewing patent and copyright as separate spheres of study. The abil-
ity to locate such common understandings suggests that a unified
theory of intellectual property could exist despite the manifest differ-
ences between patent and copyright law.223
Patent and copyright law require a certain threshold level of creativity
in their works, resulting in the law granting an incentive of an exclusive
right in exchange for societal benefits.224 Without such protections, the
creators of patented and copyrighted works might forego their creations.
Jeanne Fromer has coined the term “expressive incentives” to describe
the ways in which copyright and patent law protect creators’ labor and
personhood interests:225
221. STENGEL, supra note 88, at 232.
222. See supra Section IV. B.
223. Fromer, supra note 185, at 1442-43.
224. Id.
225. Fromer, supra note 204 (building the case for expanding the concept of intellectual
property’s incentives to include expressive incentives as well as traditional pecuniary ones
by drawing parallels to literature on law and norms and expressive theories of the law).
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Evidence from multiple vantage points demonstrates how signifi-
cantly authors and inventors care about their personhood and labor
interests in the works they create. Pertinently . . . they believe that
their self-concept is critically bound up in their creations; they are
uniquely situated to employ their personal vision and genius to cre-
ate their works; they create in large part for reputational gains; they
psychologically possess their creations; and they often hold strong
interests in their works and their works’ integrity by virtue of their
expended labor.226
Fromer’s “expressive incentives” could equally apply to trademark cre-
ation that requires similar levels of creativity. This is not to say that we
should require creativity before trademark protection applies; rather, we
should recognize the importance of its existence in some cases. The con-
cept of the “brand” now includes conveying to potential consumers the
“self-concept” of the company. Brand creators are uniquely situated to
identify their products’ intrinsic “fundamental human value” and to ex-
press this message creatively and memorably to consumers. Brands are
created for reputational gain as well as for a company’s financial gain;
and brand creators are strongly interested in the protection of their works
because of the labor expended to develop them. Based on this compari-
son, the creation of trademarks as part of brands, and their impact on
consumers run parallel with those of copyrights and patents. Fromer
asserts:
Protectability is the key to whether particular works can reap the
benefits of intellectual property protection and, correspondingly,
whether the availability of protection will encourage the production
of such works in the first instance.227
Because of the lower threshold standard, copyrights are easier to ob-
tain than patents. Fromer sets out the answers previously provided by
scholars as to why that is, but argues that the full answer lies within the
psychological process by which artists and scientists create their works
and by which individuals experience them.228
The discussion in this Article demonstrates the degree to which trade-
marks are now not just source identifiers of products, but instead key
parts of brands. The creators of such brands utilize a creative process not
unlike that used by those who develop copyrights and patents. And per-
haps more importantly, a “psychological process” is utilized by the cre-
ators of brands to touch fundamental human values, thereby influencing
the way in which consumers experience brands. This is not unlike the
“psychological process” that Fromer recognizes is a key component of the
incentives that drive the development of copyright and patents. The steps
226. Id. at 1760.
227. Fromer, supra note 185, at 1442. To merit protection under patent law, inventions
must meet the high hurdles of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-
103 (2012). Copyright law requires a lower threshold of creativity. See 17 U.S.C. §102(a)
(2002).
228. Fromer, supra note 185, at 1453-56.
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in the creation process translate to parallels in consumers’ experience of
brands (which come about both through marks and other brand-related
activities like advertising) and the hedonic enjoyment that consumers ob-
tain that way.229 The extent to which this enjoyment will be available de-
pends on the precise shape of trademark law and policy, however. Next,
this Article addresses the incentivizing effects of trademarks and brand-
ing on other social behaviors.
3. Using Trademarks to Incentivize Other Potentially Desirable
Behaviors
One of the goals of the political and legal systems is to incentivize pro-
ductivity on the part of a country’s inhabitants. A way in which individu-
als become more productive is if they strive for specific things, which can
include branded goods. By influencing the power of brands, the shape of
trademark law can thus potentially indirectly influence the level of pro-
ductivity of a country.230
Motivation has been researched and analyzed by many, especially in
the context of work. Among the factors frequently identified as motivat-
ing people are both “self-indulgence” and “happiness.”231 Glenn Llopis
found that people are motivated by selfish reasons, including money, at-
tention and fame, and happiness. “[M]otivation to achieve is ultimately
based on earning a living that brings you tremendous joy and
satisfaction.”232
Researchers have examined extensive data to determine in more scien-
tific terms the relationship between money and levels of job satisfac-
tion.233 Most individuals choose to spend the majority of their adult lives
in paid employment, and many view personal satisfaction and self-con-
cept as important drivers. At the same time, when individuals are asked
why they work, money naturally is one of the most commonly cited
reasons:
No other incentive or motivational technique comes even close to
money with respect to its instrumental value. . . . For most, the choice
to work may not be seen as much of a choice at all, since money
provides sustenance, security, and privilege. To no small extent, peo-
ple work to live, and the pecuniary aspect of the work is what sus-
229. Trademark law has the power not only to affect the creation of marks themselves
but can also have a peripheral effect on encouraging advertising and the like.
230. This Article brackets out a discussion of the larger cultural critiques that indict
capitalism for creating so-called false needs. This issue is addressed at greater length in
Manta, supra note 190. See generally MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIA-
LECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (1944); HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964).
231. Glenn Llopis, The Top 9 Things That Ultimately Motivate Employees to Achieve,
FORBES (June 4, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/glennllopis/2012/06/04/top-9-things-
that-ultimately-motivate-employees-to-achieve/3/ [https://perma.cc/HU7Z-H2VD].
232. Id.
233. Thomas Judge et al., The Relationship Between Pay And Job Satisfaction: A Meta-
Analysis Of The Literature, J. VOCATIONAL BEHAVIOR 77 (2010). The study used meta-
analysis to estimate the correlation between pay level and job satisfaction.
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tains the living.234
The study goes on to highlight the fact that there are few more visible
signs of success in society than those related to the income and the indicia
of such wealth. “Comparatively wealthy people are able to afford a whole
host of goods and services—homes, schooling, health care, luxuries—that
presumably greatly enhance quality of life.”235
Sometimes overlooked is the relationship between the motivation to
purchase luxuries and other products and the unique trademarks and
brands designed by companies to designate these goods and draw con-
sumers to purchase them. Consumers work so that they are able to
purchase the goods to enhance their lives and reflect their wealth and
status.236 It seems clear that the existence of brands, which are designed
to tap into consumers’ most fundamental human emotions, are among the
motivating factors that encourage the desirable behavior of having people
gainfully employed.
Luxury goods are traditionally defined as goods for which the mere use
or display of a particular branded product brings the owner prestige apart
from any functional utility.237 Meanwhile, a modern definition of so-
called “new luxury goods” explains that they are “products and services
that possess higher levels of quality, taste, and aspiration than other
goods in the category but are not so expensive as to be out of reach.”238
People purchase luxury branded goods for a variety of reasons, including
socio-economic status (e.g., “keeping up with the Joneses”), brand recog-
nition (e.g., quality and safety), loyalty, personal motivation, and even
social media fame.239
The possibility arises that people work harder or longer to purchase
particular items, including luxury brands.240 Owning luxury brands is a
status symbol; plainly, people want to fit in with their neighbors and/or
234. Id. at 157.
235. Id. at 162.
236. For a critical view of the effect of brands on social behavior, see Barton Beebe,
Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809 (2010).
237. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, Foreign Counterfeiting of Status Goods, 103
Q. J. ECON. 79 (1988), http://www.nber.org/papers/w1915.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH5V-WB
HR].
238. Michael J. Silverstein et al., Trading Up: Why Consumers Want New Luxury
Goods—and How Companies Create Them 16 (2008).
239. See Young Jee Han, Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role of Brand Prom-
inence, 74 J. MARKETING 15 (2010); Alexander Koch et al., Self-Rewards and Personal
Motivation, 68 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 151 (2014) (discussing that consumers purchase
luxury items as a self-reward for hard work); Alice E. Marwick, Instafame: Luxury Selfies
in the Attention Economy, 27 PUB. CULTURE 137 (providing examples of youths purchasing
luxury goods to gain social media celebrity status).
240. See generally Tyler Cowen, Why Hasn’t Economic Progress Lowered Work Hours
More?, YOUTUBE (March 21, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Pk654J8-5c
[https://perma.cc/Y5TR-GPSA] (exploring the reasons why individuals work more hours
than strictly necessary); Robert H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Weighing the Cost of Excess
(2010) (noting the trend of working to buy luxury goods, albeit critically). See also Edward
J. McCaffery, Must We Have a Right to Waste?, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITI-
CAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 77, 83 (Stephen R. Munzer ed. 2001) (characterizing luxury
spending as potential waste).
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project a certain image to them. Also, studies show that people, even if it
can be short lived, are emotionally satisfied when they purchase luxury
goods.241 Further, brand recognition is often associated with higher qual-
ity and safety.242 Although intuition and preliminary evidence suggest
that people would work harder or longer to obtain a specific item, the
question remains understudied empirically.243 One of the most relevant
projects sets out to prove that “one of the reasons that Americans work
longer hours than their counterparts . . . is because of desires for higher
levels of material consumption in the US, which are driven by advertis-
ing.”244 Notably, most economists do not share the authors’ view that the
intensity of advertising influences income-leisure decisions.245 At the
same time, the results of this study “demonstrate the possibility” that an
American’s high hours of work per week are due to their preferences for
luxury consumer goods.246 Further, unsurprisingly, the study shows a di-
rect relationship between 1) income and more hours worked and 2) con-
sumption of luxury goods.247
In an interesting perspective, one author articulated that owning status
symbols can (and does) open doors for minorities. Tressie McMillan Cot-
tom explained that “[t]here is empirical evidence that women and people
of color are judged by appearances differently and more harshly than are
white men.”248 She notes by way of personal anecdote that owning a suit
of a recognizable brand has positively impacted her job interviews.249 It is
not a stretch to believe that there are some people who work extra shifts
(or even an extra job) to obtain luxury goods that will allow them to
progress socially, including in the context of overcoming racial barriers.
Below is a short story from Michael Silverstein, describing a conversa-
tion with a typical blue-collar American, Jake, and the founder of Cal-
laway Golf, a luxury golf club manufacturer.250 The short story illustrates
why people buy luxury goods, the benefits of buying luxury goods, and
241. See Koch, supra note 239. But see ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY
MONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (2001) (describing situations where peo-
ple keep buying luxury goods to satisfy short-term reward, although in some situations this
can result in long-term debt and unhappiness).
242. Emma Macdonald & Byron M. Sharp, Brand Awareness Effects on Consumer De-
cision Making for a Common, Repeat Purchase Product; A Replication, 48 J. BUS. RES. 5
(2000) (“I’ve heard of the brand, so it must be good”).
243. See generally Yann Truong, Personal Aspirations and the Consumption of Luxury
Goods, 52 INT’L J. MARKET RESEARCH 653 (2010) (highlighting that studies that depict
consumer motivations are common, but studies detailing how people afford luxury goods
are uncommon); see also Keith Cowling & Rattanasuda Poolsombat, Advertising and La-
bour Supply: Why do Americans Work Such Long Hours?, 25 INT’L REV. APPLIED ECON.
283 (2011) (“To draw any conclusions from overtime hours, however, is not possible.”).
244. Id. at 284.
245. Id. at 289.
246. Id. at 295.
247. Id. at 296.
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the determination and effort to forego inferior goods to save for the per-
ceived luxurious model:
Consider Jake, a thirty-four-year-old construction worker earning
about $50,000 a year, whose passion is golf. It took Jake a year to
save enough money to buy a complete set of Callaway golf clubs—
$3,000 worth of premium titanium-faced drivers, putters, and
wedges—although he could have bought a decent set from a conven-
tional producer for under $1,000. During the eight-month golf season
in Chicago, Jake works the 6 A.M. shift so he can be on the course by
2 P.M.; he plays eighteen holes nearly every weekday after work
and—again, believe it or not—twice on Saturday and twice more on
Sunday. He is a three-index golfer, which means he is in the top 1
percent of all recreational golfers in terms of skill. We played a
round of golf with Jake at a public course, during which he described
in detail the technical differences and performance benefits of his
Great Big Bertha clubs. “But the real reason I bought them,” he told
us at last, “is that they make me feel rich. You can run the biggest
company in the world and be one of the richest guys in the world, but
you can’t buy any clubs better than these.” Then, looking at us with a
hint of a smile, Jake said, “When I kick your butt on the course, I feel
good. I feel equal. I may make a lot less money than you do, but I
think I have a better life.” After the round (during which he did, in
fact, kick our butts), Jake carefully placed his clubs in his pickup
truck and said, “Thank you, Mr. Callaway, for another fine day.”251
Although in this short story, Jake’s purchases are not supported by
working overtime or “working harder,” it is clear that he was motivated
to work for his luxury experience and his luxury clubs. He altered his
work schedule to obtain a luxury (playing golf daily) that is typically only
available to trust fund recipients, retired workers, and hedge fund
managers.252
Indeed, “[America’s middle-market consumers] are willing, even eager,
to pay a premium for remarkable kinds of goods that we call New Lux-
ury.”253 “It is widely accepted that people make inferences about others
on the basis of their possessions.”254 One author describes certain con-
sumers as parvenus (the Latin pervenio meaning “arrive” or “reach”),
finding that they are mainly concerned with separating or disassociating
themselves from the have-nots.255 Owning expensive goods—particularly
in visible categories like cars—can signal a higher community status.256 A
person who is concerned with her community status may be inclined to
work harder or longer hours in the short term to purchase a specific item
that she believes will increase that status. “For such persons, luxury brand
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in the absence of authentic achievement.”257
Some have issued the critique that “keeping up with the Joneses” re-
sults in a zero sum outcome:
Suppose that both neighbors are working a standard week, and driv-
ing modest sedans. However, by putting in a bit of overtime, it is
possible for each to buy a more expensive car, say an SUV. Suppose
further that the extra status associated with being the only one to
own such a vehicle is of greater value than the foregone leisure time,
and that the humiliation associated with being the only one not to
own such a vehicle is worse than the loss of leisure. . . . . Both neigh-
bors will decide to work harder, either to get the extra status, or just
to avoid the humiliation. As a result, they will wind up right back
where they started–both driving the same type of car, both having
the same relative status–except that now they will be working harder
in order to maintain their lifestyle. Thus the outcome produced
through status competition is inferior, from both of the participants’
perspectives, to the situation that initially obtained. (Notice, inciden-
tally, that the possibilities for status competition are limited by the
range of consumption goods available. The appearance of exotic new
consumption goods makes it possible for individuals to distinguish
themselves in a new way. Thus consumers can be harmed by the in-
troduction of new status goods, even if they voluntarily purchase
them.)258
This need not be correct, however. First, there are many more actors
involved in these situations than just the two neighbors. Hence, if they
both worked hard, they will likely gain self-perceived status over others.
Some of these others may not have the same perceptions of social status
in the first place, and so even though lovers of luxury brands feel better
about themselves and are incentivized to work harder to obtain them,
brands will make no difference one way or another to a number of other
people. Not only that, but the individuals with new cars may never or
hardly ever run into people with different values (who will often live in
different neighborhoods, etc.). It is thus not at all obvious that one per-
son’s perceived rise in status necessitates someone else’s perceived drop.
Meanwhile, the productivity and creativity that an individual may have
had to exert to achieve greater purchasing power could have accom-
plished far-reaching benefits in realms such as science, medicine, or
business.
Finally, this Section seeks to focus on the way in which trademarks can
incentivize productivity because branded goods can serve as self-rewards,
meaning self-administered gifts as incentives for personal accomplish-
ment.259 For example, people may reward themselves with a coffee from
257. Brent McFerran et al., Evidence for Two Facets of Pride in Consumption: Findings
from Luxury Brands, 24 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 455, 457 (2014).
258. Joseph Heath, The Structure of Hip Consumerism, 27 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM 1, 10
(2001).
259. See Koch, supra note 239.
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Starbucks for studying all day. On a grander scale, people may reward
themselves for a promotion with buying a new pair of shoes or bottle of
wine that they otherwise would not have purchased. In a survey con-
ducted by KPMG in China, “over 60 percent of the respondents bought
luxury goods as a way to reward themselves for their hard work and suc-
cess.”260 Although this study did show that people reward themselves
with luxury goods for working hard or finding success, it did not specifi-
cally state that people worked harder or longer than what was in fact
required of them. Notably, working from home is becoming increasing
popular.261 Offices are designed to minimize distractions and increase
productivity. Thus, one can easily imagine a scenario in which people re-
ward themselves with luxury goods for just “getting through” a typical
workday at home.262 Their relationship with branded goods, whether of
the true luxury or everyday “mini-luxury” style (e.g., a cup of Starbucks
coffee) may provide a particularly fertile ground for future study.
One new-age argument for people working harder to purchase luxury
goods, whether on behalf of themselves or their entire families, is the
concept of the “microcelebrity.”263 Microcelebrities are famous as a re-
sult of their social media accounts. Examples like “Rich Kids of In-
stagram” and Kane Lim prove that people can get famous just by
showing that they have access to luxury goods.264 This may incentivize
people to be more productive and find new ways to contribute to society
that result in financial rewards such as the purchase of luxury goods,
which has shown to increase the number of followers that one can
obtain.265
The mechanisms through which people finance luxury purchases are
either by saving the money up front or taking out loans. Either one could
result in greater productivity to earn the additional income. Indeed, his-
torians have traced the shifts that led American society toward an ethic of
full-time work in the name of greater consumption as opposed to shorter
hours and less purchasing power.266 Some empirical data suggests that
Americans may work longer hours than their European counterparts by
individual rather than simply by employer choice because they wish to
attain a higher level of consumption.267 While it is difficult to measure
empirically the effects of consumerism on the functioning of the Ameri-
260. Id. at 165.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 166 (finding that employees have more freedom working from home, and
thus, more opportunities for self-regulation).
263. See Marwick, supra note 239, at 138 (defining a microcelebrity as a “collection of
self-presentation practices . . . in which users strategically formulate a profile . . . to in-
crease attention and thus improve their online status”).
264. Rich Kids of Instagram (@richkidsofinstagram), INSTAGRAM, http://richkidsofin-
stagram.tumblr.com/ [https://perma.cc/3E5S-C5AG].
265. See Marwick, supra note 239, at 143 (“Since [Instagram] consists primarily of pho-
tographs, it intensifies the importance of visual self-presentation.”).
266. Benjamin Kline Hunnicutt, Work Without End: Abandoning Shorter Hours for the
Right to Work (1988).
267. Cowling & Poolsombat, supra note 243.
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can economy, in a recent study that evaluated countries’ levels of creativ-
ity (using as metrics levels of technology, talent, and tolerance), the
United States came in second and was outranked only by the culturally
fairly similar Australia.268
D. TRADEMARK LAW AND INCENTIVIZING FUNCTIONS
Trademark law does not operate in a vacuum. Like all other law and
policy, it shapes individual and societal behavior. How we draw the con-
tours of trademark law affects the three incentivizing functions high-
lighted in this Article. Complex empirical questions abound, such as the
precise mechanisms behind and effects of dilutive marks.269 The key
point, however, is that whatever the answers are to those kinds of ques-
tions, they are relevant to the contours of trademark law and hence to
incentivization. This parallels the difficult determinations we must make
when calibrating copyright or patent law to societal goals based on the
(national and international) data that we are able to obtain.
Objectors may argue that this paper defends an unappealing version of
consumerism that has negative consequences. For example, to the extent
that longer work hours result from the desire for specifically branded
goods, these hours may have an impact on health and happiness.270 That
said, according to at least one study, a worker’s health and happiness is
generally unaffected when he is working overtime for personal reasons,
including to pursue luxury goods.271 Some studies also suggest that sub-
jective wellbeing based on the pursuit of such goods depends on the ini-
tial mindset of the individuals involved.272 Ultimately, this Article does
not imply that a specific vision and level of consumerism are correct.
Rather, it argues that whichever level the political system chooses to pri-
oritize should be supported by a corresponding calibration of the trade-
mark system given the direct relationship between 1) this system and 2)
branding, as well as its effects on the incentivizing functions of marks.
The same is true for value judgments regarding the cultural effects of
the pursuit of status goods.273 One related critique is that the pursuit of
such goods creates a never-ending zero-sum game in which individuals
constantly seek to one-up one another and never end up satisfied.274
268. See Jake Flanagin, These Are the World’s “Most Creative” Countries, QUARTZ
(Oct. 16, 2015), http://qz.com/523124/these-are-the-worlds-most-creative-countries/ [https://
perma.cc/YBE7-6ZUH].
269. I discuss some of these issues in Manta, supra note 190.
270. See generally Debby G.J. Beckers et al., Voluntary or Involuntary? Control over
Overtime and Rewards for Overtime in Relation to Fatigue and Work Satisfaction, 22 WORK
& STRESS 33 (2008).
271. See id. (comparing relative happiness and satisfaction levels for voluntary and in-
voluntary employee overtime).
272. Liselot Hudders & Mario Pandelaere, The Silver Lining of Materialism: The Im-
pact of Luxury Consumption on Subjective Well-Being, 13 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 411 (2011).
273. See generally Beebe, supra note 236.
274. For a discussion of the role of status goods as part of the larger phenomenon of
status anxiety, see generally ALAIN DE BOTTON, STATUS ANXIETY (2005).
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While the thesis of this Article does not hinge on any answer, there are
several responses to that concern. The first is that a certain level of dissat-
isfaction in that context need not be inherently bad if it motivates people
to strive for more achievements and they contribute to the economy
through creativity in a variety of forms and through sheer hard work.
Second, it is entirely possible that rather than leading to a never-ending
quest, status goods actually allow people to feel equal to others rather
than better than them. This may be particularly true for individuals who
do not come from families of blue-blooded lineage and have only recently
“arrived,” which would enable greater fairness and meritocracy in that
sense. As a related matter, brands provide a shorthand to those that did
not grow up educated as to what qualifies as high-level quality, a skill that
intuitively tends to correlate with socioeconomic status. This becomes an-
other way in which brands can serve an equalizing function because an
individual from a modest background who works his way up can quickly
access higher quality without delving into expensive and time-consuming
research. To the extent to which people are interested in acquiring quality
or “taste,” in part to enable status-signaling, brands may thus increase
social efficiency.
This Article agrees with the scholars who have argued that dilution law
and other doctrines that do not relate to confusion at the point of sale
have at times moved away from the original purpose of trademarks. The
Article goes a step further by asking: now that we have the doctrines that
we have—which provide some (empirically largely unexplored) level of
incentives for society’s creativity and productivity—how do we best eval-
uate possible changes to trademark law and policy?
Even though the related social science is messy due to the complex
constellation of factors involved, empirical data will need to play an im-
portant role in these determinations, as mentioned above. This is so be-
cause even if enough social and political actors agreed on the goals of the
legal framework, the debate would move to how to reach them. Con-
versely, what we learn about the world through empirics may affect the
values that we seek to have the law pursue in the first place. Future de-
bates will involve questions such as how we can measure societal well-
being, on both economic and other hedonic axes, and what levels and
types of consumerism will advance social progress on these measures.275
As difficult as these explorations are from both philosophical and meth-
odological viewpoints, society cannot hide from them, and if trademark
law is left out of the calculus, its values will just be assigned by default.
One of the areas that will require the closest examination in this re-
spect is dilution law. The first step will be an analysis of the ways in which
dilution weakens brands in the eyes of consumers, or at least realistically
risks doing so. The second matter is looking at the extent to which the
275. For an example of a recent study that seeks to explore one of these questions see
Darwin A. Guevarra & Ryan T. Howell, To Have in Order to Do: Exploring the Effects of
Consuming Experiential Products on Well-Being, 25 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 28 (2015).
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current law can protect against this risk. The third is balancing the gains
from the legal framework in protecting brands against the drawbacks of
such protection. These drawbacks include potential First Amendment
concerns, but also questions of how high the level of protection can be
before it inhibits the ability of other brands to develop as part of a com-
petitive market.276 Despite all their limitations, empirical studies and pos-
sibly cross-jurisdictional analyses are the tools most likely to provide
answers in the inquiry of how we should shape dilution law and other
areas of trademark protection. Last, when conducting these inquiries, one
should remain mindful of the dynamic relationship between the law and
business practice, which will lead to fluctuations over time in its own right
and a need to retest and recalibrate periodically accordingly.277
On a theoretical level, Michael Abramowicz and John Duffy have ar-
gued that intellectual property, including trademarks, can encourage mar-
ket experimentation because an entrant into a new market will be able to
maintain market share when faced with competition.278 For example, the
ability of the company Netflix to maintain its name allows it to continue
exploiting its position as the first entity with its business model, a possibil-
ity which will encourage entities in other lines of business to take more
risks as well than they would otherwise because they will hope to benefit
from the same.279 Abramowicz and Duffy argue that as a result, trade-
marks can serve a useful function, even if consumers engage in irrational
brand loyalty, and that doctrines like initial interest confusion, the strict
rather than liberal application of genericide, trade dress protection, and
dilution have a place in the legal system due to their role in incentivizing
market experimentation.280
Indeed, some have questioned further the doctrinal isolation of each
field of intellectual property and have argued that the relationships be-
tween fields can have a positive impact on research and development,
such as when trademarks are used to leverage patent protection.281
Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman have critiqued the Supreme
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Court’s reluctance to embrace the idea that “[p]atents can help create
goodwill, and trademarks can be used to appropriate the gains from
innovation.”282
While empirical research will prove significant in balancing the effects
on first- versus second-order innovation of particular trademark doc-
trines—which is the same analysis we must conduct when constructing
copyright and patent regimes—we at least have some clues as to which
areas of trademark law will deserve particular attention. The boundaries
around trademark law are of special importance under some circum-
stances because, unlike copyrights and patents, trademarks can be re-
newed indefinitely.283
Assuming that we accept the importance of the link between 1) the
incentivizing functions of brands and 2) trademark law, we must next de-
termine the proper subject matter of marks. How much should we protect
product packaging and, more controversially, product design to calibrate
market incentives properly? The second set of questions revolves around
trademark infringement away from the point of sale, meaning both initial
interest confusion and post-sale confusion. In recent years, both of these
doctrines have rarely been enforced, especially outside of contexts in
which point-of-sale confusion was present as well. The third set of ques-
tions targets non-confusion doctrines such as dilution by blurring or
tarnishment. Here as well, it is currently difficult to make out a case of
dilution that does not also involve confusion. Perhaps both the confusion
doctrines outside the point of sale and the non-confusion-based doctrines
serve a protective function by discouraging excessive encroachments,
however. All these matters are worthy of further investigation, but the
possibility that incentivizing functions are present, combined with the dif-
ficulties inherent in conducting precise measurements in this area, may
give pause when one considers calls for the immediate abolishment of
these doctrines.
Some would argue that perhaps the legal system should consider only
protecting creative marks through doctrines such as dilution given that
many trademarks are not especially creative and may not provide a lot of
hedonic benefits. Just like we only require a minimal level of originality in
copyright law, however, trademark law has its reasons not to draw such
distinctions. Like in copyright, where we try to limit the amount of quali-
tative analysis in which judges engage such as not to have them decide
what is “good” art worthy of protection,284 trademark law is a poor vehi-
cle for judicial aesthetic critique.
As a final matter, a note of caution is advisable here about those who
use trademark law to keep out competitors outside the intended purview
of the law. First, a trademark system can only carefully calibrate incen-
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tives if it guards against the possibility that some entities, especially those
with large financial means, will engage in trademark bullying. Other
scholars and I have discussed previously some strategies and procedures
that the legal system could adopt to hem in bullying behavior.285 Second,
in addition to containing the risk of bullying, the law can inherently prove
to be an overdeterrent to innovation if it promotes uncertainty.286 Due to
the difficulties with line-drawing and the existence of multiple balancing
tests in the IP context, policymakers may well choose to provide stricter
legal definitions for trademark-related offenses than they might other-
wise prefer, as a means to provide a “buffer zone” against the hazards
involved in the judicial discretion that will ineluctably follow.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article set out to demonstrate that trademark law is far from be-
ing the red-headed stepchild of the intellectual property family. Society
enjoys trademarks as art, has hedonic appreciation of the joint entity that
arises when a trademark and the rest of a product combine, and receives
motivation to perform other important functions through the incentive
that is the increased ability to purchase branded goods. Trademarks have
come a long way from their days as mere source identifiers and guaran-
tors of quality. Brands that contain trademarks form a significant part of
the market economy, and the law must either embrace that or openly
reject it. If it chooses to do the latter, however, it must be with society’s
full recognition that the differences between trademark law and other
forms of IP law have been overstated with regard to incentives. In the
end, trademarks may belong in the pantheon of intellectual property after
all rather than being relegated to handmaiden status.
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